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Beyond the National Narrative: Implications of 
Reunification for Recent German History [2010] 
Konrad H. Jarausch  
Abstract: »Jenseits der Nationalen Meistererzählung: Implikationen der Wie-
dervereinigung für die deutsche Geschichtsschreibung«. This essay addresses 
the interpretative implications of German unification. First, the precise interac-
tion between the international framework of détente and the internal dynamics 
of the democratic awakening has to be traced in order to explain the surprising 
overthrow of Communism and the return of a German national state. Therefore 
part of the history of the years 1990-2010 in Germany, sometimes referred to 
as the “Berlin Republic”, can be understood as working out the consequences 
of unification. But then it must also be realized, that a growing part is also 
composed of other issues such as globalization, immigration and educational 
reform. Hence the resumption of the national narrative is a backward-looking 
perspective that blocks the recognition of more recent problem areas that can-
not be dealt with by telling a success story about the Federal Republic. Instead 
a history of the present require an engagement with new transnational issues of 
postmodern modernity. 
Keywords: German unification, détente, democratic awakening, Berlin Repub-
lic, globalization, success story of the FRG, history of the present. 
 
The elaborate celebrations of the twentieth anniversary of 1989/90 have contri-
buted surprisingly little to illuminating the meaning of this caesura for contem-
porary history. During the past year, eye-witness accounts, media specials, 
international conferences and political speeches sought to enshrine the inspir-
ing dissident narrative of a “peaceful revolution” by East German citizens as 
the official interpretation.1 During the current year, commemorations are bound 
to focus instead on the more controversial recovery of national unity through 
Helmut Kohl’s leadership and Mikhail Gorbachev’s as well as George Bush’s 
help by embedding German reunification in a wider restructuring of Europe. In 
spite of all subsequent difficulties, there is ample reason to celebrate the 
overthrow of the SED-dictatorship and the accession of the five new states to 
                                                             
  Reprint of: Jarausch, Konrad H. 2010. Beyond the National Narrative: Implications of 
Reunification for Recent German History. German History 28: 498-514. 
1  Geschichtsforum “Erzählen Sie doch Ihre eigene Geschichte von 1989!” 
<www.tagesspiegel.de/meinjahr89>; Henrik Bispinck et al., eds., Programm: Geschichtsfo-
rum 1989/2009. Europa zwischen Teilung und Aufbruch (Berlin, 2009). Cf. Konrad H. 
Jarausch, “People Power? Towards a Historical Explanation of 1989,” in Vlad Tismaneanu, 
ed., The End and the Beginning. The Revolutions of 1989 and the Resurgence of History 
(Budapest, 2012). 
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the Federal Republic. Yet such self-congratulation tends to serve a conservative 
agenda that silences criticism of the process and its consequences. 
Far from being settled, the questions of how to interpret the fall of the Wall 
and the return of a national state have set off a fierce ideological contest over 
public memory. For instance, the CDU claims that Konrad Adenauer’s anti-
Communist magnet theory deserves the chief credit for reunification, while the 
SPD instead points to the subversive effects of Willy Brandt’s “change through 
convergence” in Ostpolitik.2 Similarly, most Western commentators see the 
toppling of the SED-regime as overdue liberation while many disappointed 
Eastern intellectuals complain about being annexed and subsequently colo-
nized.3 Though Cold Warriors tend to blame most of the transition problems on 
the rotten legacy of the GDR, critics of the Left instead emphasize the mistakes 
of the unification process such as the rapid privatization by the Trusteeship 
Agency ….4 At stake in these debates is the chief historical lesson of the failure 
of Communism – a conservative neo-totalitarian understanding that equates the 
SED dictatorship with the Nazis or a leftist commitment to anti-fascism that 
fears the structural and ideological continuities of the Right. 
Blindsided by these events, historians have been unable to provide a correc-
tive, since they have themselves struggled to integrate the Wende into larger 
accounts of post-war development. While conservatives like Hans-Peter 
Schwarz initially hailed the “end of the identity neurosis,” moderates like 
Thomas Nipperdey interpreted 1989/90 as the completion of the national-
liberal struggle for freedom and unity of the 19th century.5 Distressed that their 
post-national agenda had been overturned, critical historians like Hans-Ulrich 
Wehler concentrated on beating back a neo-conservative effort to renationalize 
German historical consciousness through a “normalization” campaign.6 But 
lack of prior interest in the GDR made it difficult for scholars like Jürgen 
Kocka to fit “real existing Socialism” into a broader history of Western moder-
                                                             
2  Jens Hacker, Deutsche Irrtümer. Schönfärber und Helfershelfer der SED im Westen (Berlin, 
1992) versus Heinrich Potthoff, Im Schatten der Mauer. Deutschlandpolitik 1961 bis 1990 
(Berlin, 1999). 
3  Richard Schröder, Die wichtigsten Irrtümer über die deutsche Einheit (Freiburg, 2007) 
versus Kurt Pätzold, “Anschluss mit Abwicklung”, Weltbühne, April 9, 1991.  
4  See the contradictory interviews by Wolfgang Schäuble and Edgar Most in Adolf Haasen, 
Toward a New Germany: East Germans as Potential Agents of Change (Bloomington, 
2009). 
5  Hans-Peter Schwarz, “Das Ende der Identitätsneurose,” Rheinischer Merkur, September 7, 
1990; and Thomas Nipperdey, “Die Deutschen dürfen und wollen eine Nation sein,” Frank-
furter Allgemeine Zeitung, July 13, 1990. 
6  Hans-Ulrich Wehler, Die Gegenwart als Geschichte (Munich, 1995); and Konrad H. 
Jarausch, “Normalisierung oder Re-Nationalisierung? Zur Umdeutung der deutschen Ver-
gangenheit,” Geschichte und Gesellschaft 21 (1995), 571-584. 
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nization.7 Because they were not trained in East German history, historians like 
Heinrich August Winkler, Edgar Wolfrum or Eckhart Conze continued to write 
West German-centered post-war syntheses, hardly incorporating the GDR and 
treating the events after 1990 as a mere coda.8 
A recent shift in topical interests and methodological approaches has also 
kept many historians from engaging the origins, course and consequences of 
1989/90. For instance, Holocaust sensibility focuses on the war-time genocide 
and considers later developments merely in terms of memory; gender studies 
which look at constructions of femininity and masculinity in longer time 
frames are just beginning to explore German division; finally, concern with 
post-colonial questions addresses the imperialist roots of racism, but pays little 
attention to post-war events.9 At the same time the current move towards Euro-
pean, global or transnational issues transcends the nation state and ignores its 
surprising return in 1990 as something that needs to be left behind in order to 
move on to broader questions.10 While social history and cultural studies can 
contribute to explaining the “peaceful revolution” of 1989 with concepts like 
“civil society” or “recovery of authentic language,” an analysis of the unifica-
tion process in 1990 seems to require more traditional political and diplomatic 
approaches which interest few younger historians on either side of the Atlan-
tic.11 
Two decades after the overthrow of the SED and German reunification, the 
“consequences of [this] undreamt of event” therefore remain surprisingly unde-
rexplored.12 No doubt, its actual unfolding has been well documented by a 
stream of memoirs as well as numerous empirical studies, based on access to 
secret documents, primarily in Eastern files.13 But in contrast to the acute fears 
                                                             
7  Jürgen Kocka, ed., Die DDR als Geschichte. Fragen, Hypothesen, Perspektiven (Berlin, 
1994) and idem with Hartmut Kaelble and Hartmut Zwahr, eds., Sozialgeschichte der DDR 
(Stuttgart, 1994). 
8  Heinrich August Winkler, Der lange Weg nach Westen (Munich, 2000), 2 vols., Edgar 
Wolfrum, Geglückte Demokratie. Geschichte der Bundesrepublik von ihren Anfängen bis 
zur Gegenwart (Stuttgart, 2006); and Eckart Conze, Die Suche nach Sicherheit. Eine Ge-
schichte der Bundesrepublik von 1949 bis zur Gegenwart (Munich, 2009). 
9  Konrad H. Jarausch and Martin Sabrow, eds., Die historische Meistererzählung. Deutungs-
linien der deutschen Nationalgeschichte nach 1945 (Frankfurt/Main, 2002). 
10  Konrad H. Jarausch and Thomas Lindenberger, eds., Conflicted Memories: Europeanizing 
Contemporary Histories (New York, 2007). Cf. also the debates on “transnational history” 
on H-German and HSK. 
11  Konrad H. Jarausch, “Kollaps des Kommunismus oder Aufbruch der Zivilgesellschaft? Zur 
Einordnung der friedlichen Revolution von 1989,” and Martin Sabrow, “Die DDR im Ge-
dächtnis der Gegenwart,” in Eckart Conze, Katharina Gajdukowa and Sigrid Koch-
Baumgarten, eds., Die demokratische Revolution 1989 in der DDR (Cologne, 2009). 
12  Wolf Lepenies, Folgen einer unerhörten Begebenheit. Die Deutschen nach der Vereinigung 
(Berlin, 1992). 
13  Timothy Garton Ash, “1989!,” and “Velvet Revolution: The Prospects,” New York Review 
of Books, November 5 and December 3, 2009. 
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surrounding the revival of a German national state at the time, historians have 
made little effort to reflect on its meaning for their longer term narratives. 
Typical of this complacency is Andreas Roedder who concludes his survey of 
this “historical miracle” by stating that the East German civic movement stood 
in the tradition of national liberal aspirations of the 19th century, by aiming at 
“popular sovereignty, freedom and national unity.” From this perspective re-
unification was merely the delayed achievement of Western normalcy, finally 
ending the Sonderweg.14 But the multitude of unexpected post-unification prob-
lems also indicates the need to ponder alternate framings that might provide a 
more critical understanding. 
1. Explanations of Reunification 
Since reuniting the two successor states after four and one half decades of 
division was by no means foreordained, this surprising development requires a 
more systematic explanation. In contrast to Bismarck’s conquest of Germany, 
the restoration of the national state in 1990 was neither the product of a power-
ful national movement nor the result of three successful wars.15 Instead, scho-
larship is divided between those analyses which highlight the contribution of 
the democratic awakening in East Germany and those accounts which privilege 
the maneuvering of governments in Bonn, Washington and Moscow. Stressing 
the “self-liberation” of GDR citizens in the “first successful German revolu-
tion” has the merit of focusing on the popular agency which overthrew the 
SED-dictatorship, but cannot explain the form of subsequent unification.16 
Emphasizing the political struggles and the diplomatic negotiations of the 
“great game” between the major powers has the advantage of looking at the 
domestic dynamics and international shape of the settlement, but fails to give 
credit to the initiators of the issue.17 
One of the ironies of the grass-roots explanation is that the “peaceful revolu-
tion” did not even aim at reunification at the beginning. The systematic policy 
of Abgrenzung by the SED as well as consistent Stasi vigilance had put any 
thought of restoring national unity beyond the pale, since Honecker rejected 
                                                             
14  Andreas Roedder, Deutschland einig Vaterland. Die Geschichte der Wiedervereinigung 
(Munich, 2009), 376ff. 
15  Otto Pflanze, Bismarck and the Development of Germany: The Period of Unification, 1815-
1871 (Princeton, 1963). Cf. Ronald Speirs and John Breuilly, eds., Germany’s Two Unifica-
tions: Anticipations, Experiences, Responses (New York, 2005). 
16  Ehrhard Neubert, Unsere Revolution. Die Geschichte der Jahre 1989/90 (Munich, 2008), 
13; and Ilko-Sascha Kowalczuk, Endspiel. Die Revolution von 1989 in der DDR (Munich, 
2009), 544. 
17  Alexander von Plato, Die Vereinigung Deutschlands. Ein weltpolitisches Machtspiel: Bush, 
Kohl, Gorbatschow und die geheimen Moskauer Protokolle (Berlin, 2002). Cf. Roedder, 
Deutschland einig Vaterland, 49. 
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Kohl’s reference to a common nationality and chose to interpret his 1987 visit 
to Bonn as recognition of the existence of two German states. Moreover, within 
the system-immanent opposition, many dissidents genuinely believed in social-
ist values and saw some of the consequences of capitalist competition with 
horror. Only those who voted with their feet by joining the mass exodus to the 
West in the summer and fall of 1989 sought reunification on an individual level 
by escaping to the more successful system of the Federal Republic. Contrary to 
exaggerated claims after the fact, only a few dissidents like Edelbert Richter 
dared speak of unity, while the great majority of the platforms of the emerging 
opposition groups like the Neues Forum, Demokratie Jetzt or Sozialdemokra-
tische Partei were oriented towards reforming the GDR.18 
Only with the fall of the Wall on November 9, 1989 did the possibility of 
unification move from a pipedream to an actual political possibility. The ex-
cited population interpreted the partly intentional, partly accidental lifting of 
the barrier between East and West Berlin by Honecker’s successor Egon Krenz 
as a victory of pressure from below. Moreover, the first visit of millions of East 
Germans, aided by a Begrüßungsgeld, revealed the drastic difference of living 
standards between a decaying GDR and a prospering FRG, with the latter’s 
glittering commercial surface hiding some of its structural problems. As a 
result of the firsthand experience of the West and of their warm welcome, the 
demonstration slogans in Leipzig and other cities shifted from “we are the 
people” to “we are one people” in mid-November. The formerly silent majority 
of the population itself began to speak out for unification, forcing the opposi-
tion groups to revise their platforms frantically so as to include plans for a step-
by-step rapprochement of the two German states. Not the dissidents, but the 
GDR citizens drove this crucial shift of priorities.19 
It is important to recall that the prospect of reunification had different mean-
ings, depending upon age and relationship to the SED-dictatorship. For the 
older generation, it signified the restoration of a “natural” state of things before 
the division. For many of the younger cohorts, it suggested exciting possibili-
ties for consumption, popular culture and travel which had hitherto been denied 
to them. For political opponents of the regime or committed Christians, it 
promised the end of obnoxious repression and discrimination. But for suppor-
ters of the SED, the bloc parties and the many auxiliary organizations, howev-
er, it threatened many hard-won privileges. Unlike in the neighboring nation 
states, the progression from reforming Socialism to abolishing it altogether 
imperiled the very existence of the GDR, because as the head of the party’s 
institute for social sciences Otto Reinhold mused, without Socialism there was 
                                                             
18  Neubert, Unsere Revolution, 50, 239ff., 310ff.; Kowalczuk, Endspiel, 393f, 461f, 528ff. 
19  Michael Richter, Die friedliche Revolution. Aufbruch zur Demokratie in Sachsen 1989/90 
(Göttingen, 2009), 20, 397, 497, 621, 810. This is the most thorough empirical study of 
shifting popular sentiment on the local level. 
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no need for East Germany. In a way, reunification became a collective exodus 
with citizens leaving the Communist realm for the Western system without 
changing their place of residence.20 To many East Germans, unification ap-
pealed as the quickest road to prosperity and freedom. 
Ultimately the election of March 18, 1990 sealed the East German choice of 
unity by democratic means. The Round Table negotiations between the wea-
kening Modrow who had succeeded Krenz and various opposition groups were 
still busy searching for a Third Way by turning the letter of the GDR constitu-
tion a lived reality. Hence the restive population welcomed FRG leaders like 
Helmut Kohl or Willy Brandt and the fragmented pro-unification initiatives 
like the Demokratischer Aufbruch were willing to affiliate with Western par-
ties, forming a rather heterogeneous “Alliance for Germany.” To compensate 
for PDS control of the government and media, they also accepted professional 
advice and financing in the election campaign that contrasted starkly with the 
imaginative amateurishness of the dissident “Bündnis 90.” The overwhelming 
outcome, endorsing rapid unification, was therefore a fairly accurate reflection 
of the majority’s wish to join the successful West.21 Hence interpretations fo-
cused on the internal dynamics rightly stress that the initiative for unification 
came from disgruntled GDR citizens, but slight the help of outside leaders to 
bring it about. 
By analyzing domestic politics and international diplomacy an entirely dif-
ferent strand of literature explores Chancellor Helmut Kohl’s decision to seize 
upon this opportunity. It shows that the CDU’s rhetorical professions of desire 
for reunification had grown hollow through the decades and were no longer 
backed by any practical preparations. West German politicians therefore 
reacted with confusion to the spectacle of the mass exodus and demonstrations 
in the East until Kohl began to link the promise of economic help to the need to 
reform of the GDR. It took the chancellor three weeks after the fall of the Wall 
to work up the courage to make reunification an operative goal in his famous 
“Ten Point Plan” of November 28, which sketched a progression of steps from 
a confederation to an eventual federation of both Germanys. The uproar at 
home and abroad, caused by this modest suggestion, demonstrated that ending 
the German division would require overcoming considerable internal skeptic-
ism and external resistance, because it threatened to undermine the entire post-
war order in Europe.22 
                                                             
20  Konrad H. Jarausch, Die unverhoffte Einheit (Frankfurt/Main, 1995), 137ff. It is important 
to decode these multiple associations in order to understand the popular motivation which 
was not free from illusions. 
21  Richter, Die friedliche Revolution, 2: 1035ff., 1294ff., 1452ff.; and Neubert, Unsere Revo-
lution, 363ff. 
22  Helmut Kohl, Erinnerungen (Munich, 2004), vol. II; Horst Teltschik, 329 Tage. Innenan-
sichten der Einigung (Berlin, 1991); and Andreas Wirsching, Abschied vom Provisorium, 
1982-1990 (Munich, 2006). 
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Most authors agree that the international community responded rather ambi-
valently to the prospect of reunification due to historic fears of a strong Ger-
many. While the people in many countries shared in the joy of the democratic 
awakening, the governments of the victor powers and smaller neighbors re-
mained wary. The only real support came from the administration of George 
Bush which saw the collapse of Communism as a chance to advance US influ-
ence in Europe, as long as Germany remained in NATO. Caught in memories 
of the Second World War, British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher remained 
opposed, while French President Mitterrand vacillated before deciding to chan-
nel the process in a European direction.23 The key figure was Mikhail Gorba-
chev, since the Red Army still had almost half a million soldiers stationed in 
the GDR. Initially hoping that Modrow’s reform attempts would help stabilize 
his client state, the Soviet leader had no fall-back strategy in case they failed. 
His rhetoric of a “common European house” made it difficult for him to refuse 
Bonn’s insistence on the East German call for self-determination.24 
Commentators generally portray the so-called two-plus-four negotiations, 
combining the World War Two victors and the two German states, as a West-
ern success story. Much to the chagrin of the Italians, Poles or Israelis, this 
forum excluded the smaller countries in order to be able to reach an agreement 
more quickly. In these talks the experience of West German Foreign Minister 
Hans-Dietrich Genscher succeeded in resolving several smaller crises, whereas 
the neutralist influence of East German Foreign Minister Markus Meckel re-
mained negligible. In the issue of the Eastern border of a unified Germany the 
combined pressure of the international community forced a reluctant chancellor 
Kohl, who did not want to lose expellee votes, to accept the Oder-Neiße line as 
final. In the question of the future military alliance, Gorbachev ultimately con-
ceded that the Germans could stay in NATO, since a multilateral engagement 
would be preferable to armed neutrality in Central Europe. Surprisingly 
enough, many East European dissidents also supported reunification in the 
hope that lifting the Iron Curtain would reopen their own road to the West.25 
The internal and external strands of development eventually came together 
in another set of rather unequal unification treaties, symbolized by Helmut 
Kohl’s bulk overshadowing the diminutive East German Prime Minister Lothar 
de Maiziere. The limited international “window of opportunity” due to the 
instability of the Soviet Union and the progressive collapse of the planned 
                                                             
23  Philipp Zelikow and Condoleezza Rice, Germany United and Europe Transformed: A Study 
in Statecraft (Cambridge, MA, 1995); and Frederic Bozo, Mitterrand, the End of the Cold 
War and German Unification (New York, 2009). 
24  Vladislav M. Zubok, A Failed Empire: The Soviet Union and the Cold War from Stalin to 
Gorbachev (Chapel Hill, 2007). The role of Gorbachev is still hotly disputed with most 
Russian analyses highly critical and German monographs more charitable.  
25  Hans-Dietich Genscher, Rebuilding a House Divided: A Memoir by the Architect of  
Germany’s Reunification (New York, 1998). Cf. also Weidenfeld, Außenpolitik, passim. 
 334 
economy ruled out a lengthy constitutional convocation according to paragraph 
146 of the Basic Law and privileged rapid accession of East Germany to West 
Germany according to paragraph 23, first used with the Saar in 1956. Based on 
the 19th century precedent of the Zollverein, a currency, custom and social 
union of July 1, 1990 transferred the DM to the East in order to stem the flood 
of internal migrants by offering access to Western consumer goods. Even more 
complicated was the comprehensive unification treaty, which regulated the 
transfer of the Federal Republic’s institutions to the East, because all sorts of 
unforeseen questions like abortion rights, property restitution and the Stasi files 
evoked strong emotional responses. Nonetheless, enough agreement emerged 
so that the five new Eastern states could join the FRG on October 3, 1990.26 
A brief comparison with the founding of the Reich in 1871 shows that the 
second unification differed markedly, since it merely restored a prior national 
state, albeit in diminished size and chastened form. Instead of being a product 
of Bismarckian Realpolitik, reunification was a reward for the double “fulfill-
ment policy” of Adenauer’s Westbindung and Brandt’s Ostpolitik which inte-
grated the FRG in the West and allayed multiple revanchist fears in the East. 
The second time around it was not Prussia which put the rest of Germany under 
the authoritarian Hohenzollern crown, but the Federal Republic that brought 
Western forms of political participation, economic prosperity and cultural 
freedom to the East by popular request. Even if there was no constitutional 
convention, the process was democratically legitimated by the overwhelming 
GDR vote in March 1990 and confirmed by the national election the same 
December. In contrast to the Second Reich, the acceptance of all borders as 
permanent and the drying up of ethnic diasporas seemed to augur well for a 
more peaceful future in an integrating Europe.27 
2. Outlines of the Berlin Republic 
Since reflection on united Germany’s development during the last two decades 
is just beginning, historians are still groping for interpretations that go beyond 
media commentary. In contrast to the old Federal Republic associated with 
Bonn, some authors have adopted the label “Berlin Republic” to signal not just 
the shift of the capital but also the new quality of political culture and the 
growth of international responsibilities. Though there is a plethora of social 
science collections with interesting essays on particular questions, historical 
                                                             
26  Wolfgang Schäuble, Der Vertrag. Wie ich über die deutsche Einheit verhandelte (Stuttgart, 
1991); Theo Waigel, Unsere Zukunft heißt Europa. Der Weg zur Wirtschafts- und Wäh-
rungsunion (Düsseldorf, 1996). Vgl. Jäger, Überwindung der Teilung, passim. 
27  Speirs and Breuilly, Germany’s Two Unifications, passim. Cf. Neubert, Unsere Revolution, 
438, and Roedder, Deutschland einig Vaterland, 117.  
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narratives like Manfred Görtemaker’s recent synthesis are still relatively rare.28 
These preliminary explorations suggest that the story can be told in two differ-
ent ways: Most accounts focus on the rather problematic consequences of uni-
fication for the economy, society and culture, highlighting the adaptation diffi-
culties of the new citizens. Less frequent are analyses which also point to an 
entirely new set of problems related to the effects of globalization, the chal-
lenge of international terrorism and the like. How might the confusing events 
since 1990 be framed in historical terms? 
Supporters of reunification usually point out that the transfer of Western po-
litical institutions through accession to the Federal Republic seems to have 
worked relatively well. Certainly the extension of the Basic Law to the new 
states was a gain, since its protection of human rights transformed an arbitrary 
legal system into a functioning Rechtsstaat. Also the importation of a parlia-
mentary democracy was by and large positive, because it organized political 
competition between all-German parties plus the SED successor PDS accord-
ing to accepted electoral rules and produced stable governments. Moreover, the 
revival of federalism in the East built on the strong regional allegiances in 
Brandenburg, Saxony or Thuringia, rooting the five new states in popular af-
fection. Finally the adoption of the complex web of official regulations was 
speeded by “development-helpers” that advised in the renewal of the bureau-
cracy, even if these were often derided as Besserwessis.29 On the surface the 
new system functioned surprisingly well, but it left little room for the incorpo-
ration of Eastern preferences like the right to abortion and therefore hid a lin-
gering unease. 
In contrast, transformation critics emphasize that the economic “unification 
shock” was so pronounced as to trigger a veritable “unification crisis.” Al-
though the West profited initially, in the East production fell by three quarters, 
as exposure to international competition revealed the decrepit state of many 
state-owned companies. Since the productivity level was only one-third per 
capita of the FRG, the approximately 1:1 currency exchange rate and the quick 
rise of wages to 2/3 of the Western level consigned many businesses to bank-
ruptcy. The rapid privatization policy of the Trusteeship Agency did not help 
either, because it sold healthy companies to investors, while dissolving those it 
deemed uncompetitive, although some might have been salvaged with more 
governmental support. The result of such drastic deindustrialization was mass 
                                                             
28  Klaus Schroeder, Die veränderte Republik. Deutschland nach der Wiedervereinigung 
(Munich, 2006); Wolfgang Schluchter and Peter E. Quint, eds., Der Vereinigungsschock. 
Vergleichende Betrachtungen zehn Jahre danach (Weilerwist, 2001); and Manfred 
Görtemaker, Die Berliner Republik. Wiedervereinigung und Neuorientierung (Berlin, 
2009). 
29  Peter E. Quint, The Imperfect Union: Constitutional Structures of German Unification 
(Princeton, 1997); and Wolfgang Schluchter, Neubeginn durch Anpassung? Studien zum 
ostdeutschen Übergang (Frankfurt/Main, 1996). 
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unemployment at twice the Western rate, affecting especially women, 9/10 of 
which had worked in the GDR. Unfortunately most of the huge government 
transfers went into infrastructure rebuilding and welfare payments rather than 
into industrial investment.30 Therefore only a few regions achieved self-
sustained growth. 
Social observers also note that the adaptation from a collectivist to an indi-
vidualistic society disrupted many well-established life courses. The price of 
access to Western consumption was the devaluation of all those survival me-
chanisms essential in a dictatorship and the need to learn a whole new reper-
toire of behaviors like filling out life-insurance forms. With the arrival of the 
market, some important public institutions like walk-in clinics, infant care, or 
youth clubs collapsed as private substitutes generally failed to pick up the 
slack. The competitive environment produced a new group of winners such as 
small business owners, civil servants and professionals, but there were also 
plenty of losers from the displaced SED nomenklatura that resented the decline 
in their status. Due to the communist past, fewer East Germans owned proper-
ty, lived in single family homes or had sizable savings, making for a more 
proletarian environment. Though welfare transfers, pensions and unemploy-
ment benefits kept most people out of poverty, the drastic drop in the birthrate 
and continued regional depopulation indicated the severity of the adjustment.31 
Cultural commentators are still puzzled by the pervasive sense of loss that 
fueled an unexpected wave of “nostalgia” rather than inspiring a feeling of 
liberation. Some of this reaction had to do with the biographical disorientation 
of FDJ-youths who were prepared for a future that failed to materialize. Some 
of the resentment was also due to the symbolic devaluation of leading Eastern 
intellectuals like Christa Wolf who were viciously attacked by Western cultural 
critics in the Literaturstreit for supporting the SED. Some of the revulsion was 
moreover the product of media frenzy in scandalizing the Stasi collaboration of 
informal informants, thousands of whom had honeycombed GDR society. 
Finally some of the angry response was the result of displacement complaints 
of leading apologists of the Communist dictatorship who lost their jobs in the 
restructuring of the universities and the economy ….32 Ironically, many East 
                                                             
30  Jürgen Kocka, Die Vereinigungskrise. Zur Geschichte der Gegenwart (Göttingen, 1995). 
Cf. Wolfgang Seibel, Verwaltete Illusionen. Die Privatisierung der ostdeutschen Wirtschaft 
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Germans have come to feel more different from their West German cousins 
after unification than before, because they resented being second class citizens 
in a country whose cultural institutions were dominated by Western elites.  
But many other developments cannot merely be explained as consequences 
of reunification, forcing historians to adopt different interpretative frames so to 
explain their impact. A case in point is shift of domestic power from Berlin to 
Brussels due to the progress of European integration after the Maastricht treaty. 
The introduction of the Euro as common currency has replaced the hallowed 
symbol of the DM and created a new European bank with supreme authority. 
Even if the effort at streamlining EU institutional decision-making through a 
European constitution initially stalled due to the French and Dutch referenda 
defeats, the eventual ratification of the Lisbon treaty has strengthened majority 
voting and created new European offices in foreign and defense policy. The 
German Constitutional Court has therefore issued an ambivalent opinion, per-
mitting further integration but at the same time stressing the democracy deficit 
of European institutions and reaffirming its own ultimate responsibility of 
judicial review. Since it no longer fits a purely national narrative, involvement 
in Europe as an emergent polity requires a broader view.33 
In foreign policy new responsibilities have been thrust upon the FRG, ren-
dering it impossible for Berlin to act according to the cliché of being an eco-
nomic giant and a political dwarf. Fortunately, initial fears of a resurgence of 
German hegemony have proven excessive, since preoccupation with rehabili-
tating the five new states has tied up energies otherwise directed abroad. 
Though the FRG was able to avoid participation in the first Iraq war, subse-
quent requests from the international community forced a grudging reconside-
ration of defense posture that led the Constitutional Court to authorize out-of-
area deployments in the context of multilateral actions of the United Nations or 
NATO in 1994. After criticism of the premature recognition of Slovenian and 
Croatian independence by the German government, the initial posture of non-
involvement in the Balkan wars foundered when the July 1995 massacre in 
Srebrenica made it clear that abstention abetted war crimes on the German 
door-step. Hence the red-green coalition felt compelled to participate in the 
military action to prevent its recurrence in the Kosovo four years later, revers-
ing its understanding of the lesson of the Holocaust.34 
Another novel dimension has been the increasing pressure of international 
competition which has required drastic adjustments to the German welfare state 
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in order to retain its export lead. The double oil price shocks of 1973 and 1979 
undermined the “German model” of Rhenish capitalism because of its high 
wage-structure and extensive social transfers. In contrast to Honecker’s Com-
munist consumerism based on foreign loans, Helmut Kohl’s soft neo-liberalism 
of pruning state expenditures, privatizing some services and reducing welfare 
benefits succeeded in reviving economic growth. While SPD obstruction com-
plicated the post-unification adjustments, Gerhard Schroeder’s Agenda 2010 
finally cut the knot by reducing transfer payments enough to spur renewed job 
growth, though public backlash cost him the subsequent election. Concurrently 
German companies increased their competitiveness again by personnel reduc-
tions, out-sourcing and union concessions. Hence the weak growth of the econ-
omy during the 1990s was not just a product of unification but also the result of 
a painful adjustment to world market competition.35 
A final area that has become increasingly problematic due to popular fear of 
strangers is the question of immigration. While the growth of foreign minorities 
began with the so-called “guest-workers” in the 1960s, migration pressures 
increased drastically in the late 1980s and early 1990s with the arrival of an 
unprecedented number of ethnic remigrants from Eastern Europe, asylum seek-
ers from the Third World and civil war refugees from the Balkans. Since the 
Right denied that Germany was an immigration country while the Left believed 
in multi-cultural laissez faire, the CDU/FDP coalition restricted the influx 
through administrative measures. Only the red-green coalition finally managed 
to liberalize the citizenship law by easing naturalization for long-time residents 
and allowing their children to opt for a German passport. Moreover, it also 
pushed through a contentious immigration bill that tried to offer a regular 
access channel instead of having to use the claim of asylum. But some out-
breaks of xenophobic violence indicated widespread resentment, complicating 
an active integration policy and hampering the recognition of racial or religious 
diversity.36 
These examples suggest that the history of the two decades since 1990 can-
not just be written around the consequences of unification, but that its horizon 
needs to be expanded to encompass new problem areas that follow different 
trajectories. The many assessments of the degree of unity reached in “one state 
with two societies” are an understandable exercise in political rhetoric but they 
hardly contribute to historical analysis, since they are backward looking and 
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assume a homogeneous nation state as an evaluative criterion.37 Instead Euro-
pean integration, out of area deployment, neoliberal adjustments and immigra-
tion conflicts point to different kinds of transnational issues that go far beyond 
a restored national narrative. Because many of these trends began before the 
fall of the Wall and only gained additional speed thereafter, they indicate the 
need to break out of the established teleological framework that culminates in 
1989/90. Only when historians make this interpretative leap, will they be able 
to explore the most recent period of contemporary development with authori-
ty.38 
3. Transcending National Narratives 
The impact of reunification on overarching narratives of twentieth century 
history has been rather limiting, because the restoration of a democratized 
nation state has reaffirmed the traditional framework of interpretation in only 
minimally altered form. Overcoming the division has provided a convenient 
end-point to a national narrative of imperial hubris, Weimar failure, Third 
Reich transgression, GDR false start and eventual FRG redemption. From this 
perspective, the Federal Republic’s development was a success story, which 
started from the nadir of inhuman crimes and shattering defeat, gradually re-
covered dignity through political Westernization and democratization and was 
eventually rewarded for its “recivilization” by the overthrow of Communism 
and reunification with the Eastern states. In contrast to this plot line, also ex-
plored in After Hitler, lingering reservations of continuing social inequality or a 
nervous search for security could be ignored as only minor blemishes on a 
positive record. Even for the most of the Left which previously criticized West 
Germany, reunification seems to have validated the FRG’s course in retro-
spect.39 
A concomitant of such Western self-congratulation was a systematic delegi-
timation of the GDR by exposing its many shortcomings after the fact. The 
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widely publicized hearings of the Bundestag Commission of Inquiry, the inces-
sant stream of disclosures of Stasi collaboration and the numerous media scan-
dalizations of East German corruption have created a predominant image of the 
SED-regime as a repressive Unrechtsstaat. This negative depiction has re-
cycled Western accusations of Cold War propaganda and captured the deep-
seated resentment of the victims of the Communist dictatorships. But it has 
failed to address the more positive memories of many East Germans who tried 
to “lead a correct life within the wrong system.” At the same time it provoked 
the ire of former supporters of the regime who cultivated more positive recol-
lections of their own role in a post-Communist subculture. The laudable aca-
demic effort of more discerning scholars to portray the GDR as a contradictory 
system of both repression and every-day normalcy seems to have had little 
impact on overall syntheses of post-war history.40 
The 1990 focus of a resurgent national narrative has also inhibited an ex-
amination of the two decades after unification, because these tend to appear 
merely as a coda to a story that has already been completed. Due to inaccessi-
bility of primary sources and insufficient temporal distance historians are gen-
erally reluctant to engage “the history of the present.” Moreover, the current 
fixation on the “peaceful revolution” has narrowed the focus to an analysis of 
the after-effects of unification and prohibited an intellectual opening to new 
kinds of problems. In contrast, the caesura of 9/11plays a much larger role in 
the Anglo-American discussion, since it signals an elemental shock to the per-
ception of US inviolability which has triggered a veritable politics of fear. The 
attack on the World Trade Center seemed to validate Samuel Huntington’s 
clash of civilizations thesis by replacing Communism with radical Islam as the 
new enemy. The crusade against international terrorism, the wars in Afghanis-
tan and Iraq, the conflicts with Muslim minorities at home have so far hardly 
made a dent on German historical perceptions.41 
Another unintended consequence of the prevailing Westernization narrative 
has been its neglect of the transformation of Eastern Europe, although it played 
a crucial role in the overthrow of Communism and the acceptance of reunifica-
tion. Overemphasizing the importance of the Soviet Union, one recent synthe-
sis begins with the assertion “in the beginning there was Gorbachev,” recalling 
Thomas Nipperdey’s reference to Napoleon. Most interpretations agree that the 
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formation of the independent Polish trade union Solidarność inspired dissident 
protests and that the Hungarian lifting of the Iron Curtain helped unleash the 
mass exodus. But most historical discussions of the Maastricht agreement are 
preoccupied with the introduction of the Euro and the problems of restructuring 
of the EU machinery in Brussels rather than addressing the implications of the 
transformation of the East. All too few scholars have taken up Karl Schlögel’s 
somewhat facetious hint of celebrating truckers as the vanguard of reconnect-
ing Eastern to Central and Western Europe.42 The enormous importance of the 
Eastern expansion of the EU for the restoration of Germany’s central position 
in the continent has therefore been largely ignored. 
The widespread satisfaction with the end of the German Sonderweg has also 
tended to block critical thinking about problem areas which have not yet been 
resolved by it. All too often the return of a diminished and democratized nation 
state is interpreted as proof that the Germans have ceased their efforts to be 
different and that the FRG has become a normal Western parliamentary state. 
Because this development has finished the repeated German attempts at excep-
tionalism which had such bloody consequences in the past century, it is quite 
understandable that many observers are relieved. Nonetheless, this assertion is 
not entirely correct, since the German version of post-Communist transforma-
tion via accession of the new states to the existing Federal Republic differs 
from the internal transformation of existing states in Eastern Europe with 
commentators divided on the actual results.43 But even if one grants that the 
Sonderweg might really have ended, its conclusion has left an interpretative 
lacuna: With the old story successfully finished, it is not clear how to interpret 
what comes next. 
Breaking out of the reunification teleology requires a conscious effort to ab-
andon its past-centered perspective in order to look for the antecedents of the 
problems of the present. In the economic field, such a switch points to the 
crucial importance of the caesura of 1973, since the OPEC’s oil-price shocks 
ended the long post-war boom and inaugurated a period of recessions and weak 
economic growth. Instead of just being a product of repeated business down-
turns, this slow-down signaled a structural transformation to the third phase of 
the industrial revolution away from smokestack production and Fordism to 
high technology and services. The concurrent sharpening of world-wide com-
petition, labeled “globalization” in the 1990s, led to widespread deindustriali-
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zation in coal, steel and shipbuilding, eventually even shifting the production of 
consumer goods like electronics and cameras to the Far East. The resulting 
growth of long-term unemployment strained the welfare-state, eventually forc-
ing Kohl’s and Schroeder’s moderate cut-backs.44 Such headlines of the last 
decades can only be understood if their origins are explored transnationally. 
Another important problem, bypassed by traditional narratives, is the de-
struction of the environment which transcends national frontiers. In contrast to 
the fading away of the peace issue and the slow progress in gender equality, the 
new social movement of environmental activism has intensified in recent years. 
Growing out of local confrontations about the building of super-highways 
through neighborhoods or the construction of nuclear power plants in the Ba-
densian village of Wyhl, a translocal ecology movement formed in the second 
half of the 1970s that led to the founding of the Green Party. It coalesced 
around quality of life issues, focusing on the reduction of air-pollution, the 
cleaning up of water supplies and the propagation of organic foods. To combat 
the oil-crises and the fouling of the air by coal power-plants, activists focused 
on the promotion of renewable sources in wind-generation and solar power, 
making the FRG a leader in the field of alternative energy.45 Due to the fear of 
global warming, saving the climate has become an important issue of interna-
tional politics that has yet to be integrated into larger narratives. 
Yet another controversial problem where international pressures have forced 
overdue reform efforts is the modernization of the German education system. 
Since the initiatives of the 68 critics were stopped by political resistance and 
fiscal constraints, changing institutional arrangements has been exceedingly 
difficult. Moreover, with unification West German structures, themselves in 
need of reform, were extended to the new states. On the primary level, progres-
sive educators have long criticized the lack of all-day childcare and infant 
schooling which has made it difficult for women to combine work and mother-
hood in the FRG, producing one of the lowest birth-rates in Europe. On the 
secondary level, the PISA comparison revealed that the tripartite segmentation 
of the German system in Hauptschule, Realschule and Gymnasium for entry to 
blue-collar, white-collar and professional jobs, was producing inadequate re-
sults and reinforcing societal divisions. On the university level, the Bologna-
process has compelled the controversial introduction of an intermediary B.A. 
and a more selective M.A. in order to make German degrees more internatio-
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nally compatible.46 Such conflicts cannot be analyzed in a national fashion 
alone. 
A final instance of an entirely new problem area is the threat of international 
terrorism that made it impossible for Berlin to remain an uninvolved bystander. 
The dramatic pictures of the attack on the World Trade Center of 9/11 triggered 
a wave of sympathy with the US because some of it had been prepared from 
German soil. Solidarity with the human suffering led the Schroeder-Fischer 
government to tighten domestic security measures and authorize participation 
in the anti-terrorist war in Afghanistan – an unthinkable commitment in the 
Bonn Republic. Yet the SPD/Green coalition refused to join President George 
W. Bush’s Second Iraq War, since it was not convinced by the claims of wea-
pons of mass destruction or of Al-Qaeda being behind Saddam Hussein. Form-
ing an impromptu coalition with France, Russia and China demonstrated a 
growing independence in the pursuit of national interests, which secured red-
green’s reelection in 2002. Though striving to remain a reliable partner by 
supporting the Eastern expansion of NATO and the EU, Berlin slowly deve-
loped a more assertive international role.47 Again, dealing with those develop-
ments requires a broader frame of reference. 
These examples, to which other instances could be added, indicate that more 
and more long range developments and short range crises transcend the con-
ventional unification narrative. Globalization, environmental protection, educa-
tional reform, and containment of terrorism are cross-cutting issues which have 
developed since the 1970s and affected most advanced countries. This emerg-
ing problem constellation has variously been called post-industrial society, 
post-modernity or risk-society – but none of the labels has stuck so far, because 
each highlights only one aspect of a series of bewildering changes.48 Analyzing 
German responses to such challenges therefore requires quite a different, trans-
national approach that compares the general pattern with a specific set of na-
tional reactions. Moreover, the incompleteness of developments necessitates an 
open-ended narrative strategy that relates the evolution of a problem without 
knowing its resolution – an unusual and uncomfortable stance for a historian. 
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Instead of explaining a known outcome, scholars now have to muster the cou-
rage to address ongoing processes.  
4. A Second Chance 
In Fritz Stern’s fortuitous phrase, reunification has given the Germans a second 
chance at constructing a democratic national state – hopefully with more posi-
tive consequences for their neighbors and themselves.49 This unforeseen event 
has added 1989 as a new narrative teleology beyond 1933 (“why did Hitler 
come to power?”) or 1941 (“how could Germans commit such crimes?”), 
pointing to a joyous moment of democratic awakening that engulfed all of 
Eastern Europe.50 The surprising “peaceful revolution” and the astute states-
manship of Helmut Kohl revived a German nation state at a moment when 
most Eastern intellectuals were still building a better Socialism and most West-
ern thinkers were hoping to promote European integration.51 For historians this 
unexpected development poses a double challenge: On the one hand, they have 
to find convincing explanations for an outcome which they did not foresee, and 
on the other, they have to rethink the meaning of a story that previously justi-
fied division as punishment for Nazi crimes and as guarantee of peace in Eu-
rope. 
Rethinking the national narrative so as to keep it from sliding back into a 
dangerous nationalism will require at the very minimum four interpretative 
changes: To begin with, such an effort needs to address the causal relationship 
between the catastrophic first and the more benign second half of the twentieth 
century. For German history, the enormous suffering of the World Wars and 
the Holocaust prevents a Whig interpretation of ineluctable liberalization, since 
that would be an irresponsible oversimplification. While a consideration of the 
twentieth century can depart from the modernizing aspirations of the late Em-
pire, it must also confront the chauvinism of the First World War, the failure of 
the democratic experiment in Weimar, the repressive racism of the Third Reich 
and even the misguided Socialist renewal of the GDR. Given all these proble-
matic manifestations, the challenge is to explain the miraculous transformation 
through the collective learning processes after 1945 which led West Germans 
to see human rights and democratic institutions as essential aspects of a civility 
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that would improve their living standards and guarantee a more humane socie-
ty.52 
Another task is the writing of an integrated post-war history that does not 
privilege the FRG as standard for dismissing the GDR, since both claimed to 
represent Germany during the Cold War. While the Austrians quickly took up 
the Allied offer to return to independence, the two successor states in East and 
West asymmetrically competed with each other for constructing a better Ger-
many, even if East Berlin looked more to Bonn than vice versa. How can one 
tell this double story without reducing it to the contrast between a repressive 
dictatorship and an attractive democracy in which only the latter counts, since 
it won the contest after all? One possible approach might be to focus on shared 
problems such as allied occupation or on cross-cutting external influences such 
as US rock music in order to explore their similarities and differences. Another 
method might be to analyze the respective patterns of Eastern and Western 
biographies, especially of border-crossers like Biermann or Dutschke who 
experienced both systems. Such perspectives would reveal the growing diver-
gence between both states while at the same uncovering some of the socio-
cultural commonalities that eventually made reunification possible.53 
Yet another move would be to extend contemporary history to a systematic 
consideration of the drastic changes during the last two decades that are still 
masked by an appearance of stability. In contrast to Francis Fukuyama’s pre-
diction of the ascendancy of liberal capitalism, history has continued to present 
all sorts of messy problems that were not foreseen during the euphoria 
1989/90.54 In socio-economic terms the caesura of 1973 with the end of Bretton 
Woods and the first oil-price shock has started to loom larger, because it sig-
naled the end of the post-war boom and the onset of a structural transition to 
the third phase of the industrial revolution. Many of the recent problems such 
as long-term unemployment, weak growth and the overstraining of the welfare 
states have their origin in these developments. From a foreign policy perspec-
tive, 9/11 is an equally significant turning point, because it inaugurated the 
present confrontation with international terrorism, the conflict with radical 
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Islam and the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. An opening of the German narra-
tive to such new problem areas is already long overdue.55 
Finally, the writing of German history ought to be transnationalized in order 
to account for its complex entanglement with continental and global develop-
ments. Due to their central location in Europe, German speakers have always 
been more involved with their neighbors than the national narrative tended to 
show, whether through wars or peaceful exchanges.56 At present the crisis-
ridden process of European integration has made this aspect more visible 
through the growing power of common EU institutions as well as the difficul-
ties of coordinating economic policies to combat the financial crisis in the Euro 
zone. At the same time, increasing trade and migration have brought the world 
home to the Germans in the form of new products or residents from different 
backgrounds that have created both prosperity and insecurity. Misled by as-
sumptions of past stability, German historians have yet to recognize this grow-
ing fluidity within and beyond Europe.57 Only a denationalized and democra-
tized narrative will more fully be able to reflect such new and complex pro-
blems after reunification. 
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